Asset Holdings and Consumption Volatility by Orazio P. Attanasio et al.
771
[Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol. 110, no. 4]
 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/2002/11004-0001$10.00
Asset Holding and Consumption Volatility
Orazio P . Attanasio
Institute for Fiscal Studies, University College London, and National Bureau of Economic
Research
James Banks
Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London
Sarah Tanner
Institute for Fiscal Studies
We investigate the possibility that limited participation in asset mar-
kets, and the stock market in particular, might explain the lack of
correspondence between the sample moments of the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution and asset returns in U.K. data. We esti-
mate ownership probabilities to separate “likely” shareholders from
nonshareholders, enabling us to control for changing composition
effects as well as selection into the group. We then construct estimates
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of the IMRS for each of these different groups and consider their
time-series properties. We ﬁnd that the consumption growth of share-
holders is more volatile than that of nonshareholders and more highly
correlated with excess returns to shares. In particular, one cannot
reject the predictions of the consumption capital asset pricing model
for the group of households predicted to own both assets. This is in
contrast to the failure of the model when estimated on data for all
households.
I. Introduction
Asset pricing models based on the Euler equation for consumption have
not performed well empirically. In these models, the pricing kernels are
given by the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) of con-
sumption. Aggregate consumption growth, which in standard represen-
tative agent models with standard preferences determines the marginal
rate of substitution between present and future consumption, does not
exhibit enough variability to be consistent with the observed time-series
properties of asset prices and, in particular, with the mean and the
variance of the excess return on shares over a relatively safe asset such
as Treasury bills. But the equilibrium relationship between IMRS and
asset returns holds only for individuals holding complete portfolios. As
more detailed micro data on wealth and saving are made available, it
is increasingly clear that the majority of individuals do not hold large
stocks of ﬁnancial wealth or fully diversiﬁed portfolios. This suggests
that at least part of the equity premium puzzle discussed by Mehra and
Prescott (1985) (see Kocherlakota [1996] for a survey) could be ex-
plained by the systematic difference of the time-series properties of
consumption growth for asset market participants from those of aggre-
gate consumption growth.
This was a point stressed by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). They found
that a distinction between shareholders and nonshareholders is impor-
tant for resolving the empirical failure of consumption-based capital
asset pricing models (CAPM). However, groups of shareholders and
nonshareholders are deﬁned on the basis of share ownership in the last
period of the sample. Share ownership is neither a permanent nor an
exogenous state of affairs. The time-series properties of the consumption
growth of a group of individuals classiﬁed as share owners at a single
point in time might not be indicative of the properties of the IMRS
relevant for past asset prices. This is important in the United States and
particularly in the United Kingdom, where levels of share ownership
and the composition of the group of shareholders have changed dra-
matically in recent years. Second, Mankiw and Zeldes focus on the un-
conditional moments of consumption and asset returns. More efﬁciencyasset holding 773
and power can be gained considering conditional moment restrictions.
Third, the data they use contain information on food expenditure only.
If food consumption is nonseparable from the other components of
consumption, their estimates may be misleading.
This paper studies the time-series properties of shareholders’ con-
sumption and introduces a new way of controlling for the effects of
compositional change. Panel data with a sufﬁciently long time-series
dimension to allow us to identify groups of shareholders and nonshare-
holders over time, which also contain information on total consumption,
do not exist. For this reason, we develop a grouping estimator for re-
peated cross-section data that conditions on past information to hold
the composition of the group constant in looking at changes over time.
This is an extension of synthetic panel estimation that, to our knowledge,
has not been used before. We deﬁne groups of shareholders and non-
shareholders in each time period on the basis of predicted probabilities of
share ownership. Furthermore, we deﬁne these probabilities on the basis
of variables that are perfectly predictable from one period to the next.
In computing consumption growth, we compare the same group of
households in adjacent periods; that is, we compute the IMRS between
times t and using the consumption of households predicted to be t  1
shareholders at time t. The lack of panel data forces us to use the
technique we developed. However, we argue that our approach is better
able to avoid the potential biases that might be induced by changes in
the composition of stock ownership over time. Using the technique we
develop, we estimate the Euler equations for share returns and bond
returns imposing the cross-equation restriction on the parameter that
represents the curvature of the utility function. We do not, however,
model explicitly the conditional second moments of asset returns and
consumption growth.
The data we use are drawn from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey
for the period 1978–95. This gives us a long and consistent time series
of data on consumption, a crucial factor in estimating Euler equations
and asset pricing models. Changing patterns of direct share ownership
over the last 20 years also make the United Kingdom an interesting case
for analysis. The Conservative government in the early 1980s introduced
a number of measures designed to create a “share-owning democracy,”
including the heavily advertised privatization of public utilities and tax
breaks for employee share schemes. Largely as a result of these measures,
there was a near trebling of the level of share ownership over a very
concentrated period, 1985–88, which in all likelihood induced a change
in the composition of shareholders. As we discuss below, changes in the
composition of market participants can be quite problematic for the
study of asset prices. The approach we propose is partially motivated by
the need to deal with this problem, which we show to be important.774 journal of political economy
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review brieﬂy the
consumption CAPM model and its testable implications for time-series
properties of asset prices. Section III discusses in detail the econometric
technique we develop to characterize the time-series properties of a
variable for a group whose composition changes over time in a manner
endogenous to the variable of interest. In Section IV, we present evi-
dence on share ownership in the United Kingdom, and Section V uses
the time-series properties of consumption growth of “likely” (deﬁned
by estimated probabilities of share ownership) and actual shareholders
and nonshareholders to estimate the Euler equation for stocks and
bonds and interprets the results. Section VI concludes the paper with
some remarks about potential extensions.
II. The Consumption CAPM: Theory and Aggregate Evidence
A. Theory
Consider the standard intertemporal optimization problem facing a ge-
neric consumer with access to N different assets. Consumption and port-
folio decisions are assumed to follow from the maximization of the
expected lifetime value of utility from consumption (appropriately dis-
counted) subject to an intertemporal budget constraint that reﬂects the
intertemporal allocation possibilities available. Assuming that lifetime
utility displays additive separability, we can write the maximization prob-
lem for household h as
T
st max EU (c , v )b  th ,ss ,h  spt
subject to
NN
kkk A p A (1  r )  Y  C ,( 1 )  h,sh ,s1 sh ,s1 h,s1
kp0 kp0
where Ch,s denotes (nondurable) consumption in period s; vh,s denotes
other factors, observable and unobservable, that might affect the (mar-
ginal) utility of nondurable consumption (such as demographic varia-
bles or taste shocks); b is the discount factor; is the amount of wealth
k Ah,s
held in asset k; and is the rate of return on that asset. If asset k is
k rs
held in period t, a ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
U(c , v ) U(c , v ) h,th ,th ,t1 h,t1 k p E b(1  r ) , (2) tt 1 [] c c h,th ,t1
and this holds for asset k independently of whether the consumer holdsasset holding 775
other assets. Given the assumption of intertemporal separability, equa-
tion (2) can be rewritten as
k E [m (1  r )] p 1, k p 1, …,n, (3) th ,t1 t1
where is the IMRS between consumption in t and and n are mt  1, h,t1
the assets held by the consumer in nonzero amounts, assumed to be,
without loss of generality, the ﬁrst n. For the remaining assets, N  n
equation (3) does not hold as an equality.
A key implication of consumption CAPM models, therefore, is that
equilibrium returns are determined by a single factor: the IMRS. This
fact gives rise to a number of orthogonality conditions, as is clear when
one considers equation (3) for different assets. These orthogonality
conditions can be used to estimate preference parameters in (1) and,
provided that the model is overidentiﬁed, test the overidentifying re-
strictions. This was the approach followed, for instance, by Hansen and
Singleton (1982, 1983), who estimated several versions of equation (3)
using aggregate time-series data.
Equation (3) involves nonlinear relationships. As we are using a syn-
thetic panel approach and we want to allow for measurement error, we
prefer to deal with relationships that are linear in parameters. If the
utility function is given by and we assume
1g vh,t U(c , v ) p [c /(1  g)]e h,th ,th ,t
for notational simplicity that v is a scalar reﬂecting unobserved test
shocks, we can log-linearize the Euler equation (3) for asset j to obtain
ch,t1 jj j ln(1  r ) p k  gln  e  v  v , j p 1, …,N, (4) t1 h,th ,t1 h,t1 h,t ch,t
where is an expectational error and, as mentioned above, v reﬂects
j et1
unobserved heterogeneity; g is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
and, with expected utility and intertemporally separable preferences,
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; and is a
j kh,t
term including the log of the discount factor as well as conditional
higher moments of the return on asset j and of consumption growth
(such as variances and covariances). If one assumes lognormality of
consumption growth and asset returns, is given by
j kh,t
g
j j k p lnb  Var (Dlnc ) Var [ln(1  r )] h,tt h ,t1 tt 1 2
j  gCov [ln(1  r ), Dln(c )], (5) tt 1 h,t1
where the subscripts t indicate that the variance and covariances are
conditional on the information available at time t. If there are instru-
ments that are uncorrelated with and with the innovations to
j e , Dv h,th ,t1
the parameters of equation (4) can be estimated using generalized
j k , h,t776 journal of political economy
method of moments (GMM) techniques.
1 Under the assumption of
rational expectations and in the absence of measurement error, any
variable dated or earlier is a valid instrument. t  1
In what follows we estimate a version of equation (4) for two different
assets, imposing the cross-equation restriction that the coefﬁcient on
the rate of return is the same in the two equations. As the expression
in equation (5) contains the variance of each rate of return and its
covariance with consumption, we impose no restriction on the intercepts
of the two equations. If one were able to model the conditional second
moments, one could impose additional restrictions that could be in-
formative about the ability of the model to explain observed excess
returns.
B. Asset Prices in the United Kingdom
The main facts about the returns on shares and Treasury bills are not
surprising. From the ﬁrst quarter of 1978 to the last of 1995, as in the
United States, the share returns are substantially higher and more vol-
atile than the returns on Treasury bills. The average return on stocks
is 0.0228 per quarter (standard deviation of 0.09) against a return of
0.0088 for Treasury bills (standard deviation of 0.012). These ﬁgures
correspond to an annualized excess return of 0.0587 with a standard
deviation of almost 0.3.
Estimating the Euler equations on these data and on aggregate con-
sumption growth, one obtains the standard rejections of the overiden-
tifying restrictions often reported in the literature. It has been shown
(Attanasio and Weber 1993) that aggregation problems can introduce
important biases in the estimation of Euler equations using aggregate
data. In this context, the problems are exacerbated by the issue of
nonparticipation. We therefore turn to the estimation of Euler equations
on micro data that control for nonparticipation.
III. Methods
Our task is to estimate equation (4) for a group of stockholders. The
ﬁrst problem we have to face is the fact that our data are not a panel
1 In a different approach, instead of considering a system of equations, Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991) focused on excess returns and instead of conditional moments considered
unconditional ones. They show that
j E(1  r ) tt 1  ˜˜ log p gCorr r , Dlog(C ) Var(r )VarDlog(C ), [] t1 t1 t1 t1 i E(1  r ) tt 1
where As g is the only parameter to be estimated, it
ji ˜ r p log(1 r ) log(1 r ). t1 t1 t1
can be identiﬁed by making the sample equivalents of the unconditional moments equiv-
alent to the population moments.asset holding 777
but a (long) time series of cross sections. As different individuals are
observed over time, we are forced to use a grouping estimator, of the
kind proposed by Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) and used exten-
sively in the literature. This is equivalent to aggregating equation (4)
over the individuals belonging to a certain group whose membership is
ﬁxed over time and working with average (log) consumption for that group
rather than individual consumption. Ignoring variations in participa-
tion, aggregating equation (4), we get
jj j ln(1  r ) pk  g(l nc  lnc)  e  v v, j p 1, …,N, (6) t1 tt +1 tt +1 t+1 t
where the bar over a variable denotes the average over the group.
The second problem we have to tackle arises from the fact that the
Euler equation for stocks between periods t and holds only for t  1
households that hold stocks at t. Therefore, we want to look at the time-
series properties of consumption growth for shareholders and non-
shareholders (at time t) separately. In our time series of cross sections,
we do not know whether a particular individual owning shares at a point
in time owned shares in the previous quarter or will own shares in the
following one. Therefore, we cannot use the standard synthetic panel
techniques to follow the behavior of shareholders and nonshareholders.
The basic problem is easily stated if we consider the quantity we would
be using if we had a panel of stockholders. In this case, we could compute
average consumption growth in equation (6) as
o Dln(C ) { [l n( C ) Fd p 1]  [l n( C ) Fd p 1] t1 t+1 tt t
E ln(Cd ) E ln(Cd) it 1 ti t t p  , (7)
E [d ] E [d ] it it
where d is a dummy indicating share ownership, and the operator Ei
denotes the cross-sectional mean. With repeated cross sections we are
unable to compute the ﬁrst of the two terms on the right-hand side of
equation (7).
One possibility would be to group individuals at each point in time on
the basis of current share ownership. This procedure, however, is likely
to give misleading results because of changes in the composition of the
group of shareholders over time. These changes imply that the group
of shareholders is constituted of different individuals at different points
in time, so that changes in average consumption of a group so deﬁned
are not easily interpretable.
The third problem we have is that, even if we knew which individuals
observed at t were holding stocks at t, if ownership changes over time,
would be computed over different groups of individuals over v v t+1 t
time. Exogenous changes in the incentives to participate in the stock
market cause systematically different groups of consumers to enter the778 journal of political economy
market. Systematic differences in preferences among the stock owners
at different points in time might introduce biases in the estimation of
Euler equations since might be correlated with the instruments v v t+1 t
used in estimation.
2
The approach we propose is to deﬁne groups in terms of their pre-
dicted ownership probabilities at a given point in time. We limit the
variables that we use to predict ownership to those that do not vary over
time or can be predicted perfectly, such as age (see Mofﬁtt 1993). Be-
cause of this, given the estimated coefﬁcients, we can, for households
observed at time compute the probability of ownership at time t. t  1,
For each pair of adjacent time periods, we deﬁne groups of likely share-
holders and nonshareholders according to their ownership probability
in the ﬁrst of the two periods and compute the consumption growth
for these groups.
To be more precise, we deﬁne the consumption growth of what we
call the group of “likely shareholders” as
s Dln(C ) { [l n( C ) Fp(shareholder) 1 p] t1 t+1 tt
 [l n( C ) Fp(shareholder) 1 p], (8) tt t
where the notation denotes the sample mean of the variable x [ xFA] t
for the individuals observed at time t for whom condition A is satisﬁed.
The term p(shareholder)t is the predicted probability of owning shares,
and pt is a cutoff point. Notice that the condition in the two terms on
the right-hand side of (8) is the same. We compute a similar expression
for the “unlikely shareholders.”
In our empirical analysis, we experiment with two alternatives for the
cutoff point: the actual proportion of shareholders in each period t of
our sample and an arbitrary cutoff point that is constant over time. We
discuss the motivation for these choices below. What is important, how-
ever, is that the groups deﬁned in each pair of subsequent time periods
t and are formed on the basis of the same criterion: the probability t  1
of ownership at time t. For this reason it is crucial that the variables we
use to predict ownership are fully predictable or constant over time. To
compute the time-series properties (variability, correlation with ex-
pected risk premium, and so on) of the consumption growth of likely
shareholders, we compute the averages in equation (8) for all pairs of
adjacent time periods in our sample.
2 Share ownership is likely to be endogenous with respect to consumption. When hit
by a shock, a household might decide to invest in stocks when it did not before (if the
shock is positive) or might decide to liquidate its holding of stocks(iftheshockisnegative).
However, if the differences among households in and out of the market are not systematic
and if these shocks are unanticipated, this would not bias the results of a properly aggre-
gated Euler equation.asset holding 779
Given our discussion above, it should be clear that our procedure
might yield inconsistent estimates of the parameters of interest for two
reasons, arising from the lack of a longitudinal dimension in our data
and from the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, respectively. We
discuss them in turn. Note that the unobserved heterogeneity might
induce biases even if we had panel data on share ownership and con-
sumption. We claim below that our approach is better suited to deal
with this problem.
First, the expression for the consumption growth of likely sharehold-
ers on the right-hand side of equation (7) differs from the expression
on the right-hand side of equation (8) by four terms reﬂecting predic-
tion errors from the probit. Two possible misclassiﬁcations can occur.
Individuals observed either at t or at who hold shares can have t  1
and hence their consumption is not counted in our measure p( 7) ! p, t
of the IMRS. Similarly, individuals with who do not hold shares p( 7) ! pt
will have their consumption falsely included.
If we could predict share ownership perfectly, then
s DlnC p t1
and we would be measuring the consumption growth of actual
o DlnC , t1
shareholders at time t. When this is not the case, the issue is whether
the classiﬁcation errors induced by the estimation introduce a bias in
the estimates of the structural parameters and in the tests of overiden-
tifying restrictions. This in turn depends on the covariance between
these (unobserved) terms and the instruments used in our GMM pro-
cedure. If the share ownership equation includes time dummies (or is
a very ﬂexible function of time trends), the classiﬁcation errors are likely
to be uncorrelated with the aggregate instruments we use (such as
lagged interest rates and so on). Moreover, as we use instruments that
are lagged two periods, our procedure should still yield consistent es-
timates unless there are reasons to believe that the classiﬁcation errors
exhibit serial correlation.
3
Second, while our approach deﬁnes groups consistently for any two
subsequent periods, so that the deﬁnition of “consumption growth”
makes sense, group membership changes when one considers different
observations (over time) for the rate of consumption growth. The com-
position of the group of likely (and actual) shareholders changes over
time both because the probability of ownership may change over time
and because the cutoff point might change. If utility depended only on
consumption and not on unobserved taste shocks or if these taste shocks
were constant over time, this would not constitute a problem. However,
as discussed above, systematic changes in the composition of the group
3 A reductive interpretation of our procedure would see it as a test of the null hypothesis
that limited stock ownership is not the explanation of the empirical failure of the con-
sumption CAPM. That is, we check whether the consumption behavior of what we deﬁne
as the likely shareholders is systematically different from that of the rest of the population.780 journal of political economy
might induce changes over time in that might be correlated with v v t+1 t
the instruments used in estimation and therefore imply a bias. Notice
that this problem is not related to the lack of a longitudinal dimension
of our data. It would be a problem even if we were to know who among
the individuals interviewed at held stocks at t. t  1
Our different assumptions on the cutoff point are meant to deal with
this problem. By choosing a ﬁxed cutoff, we are likely to minimize the
biases induced by changes in the composition of the group. By choosing
a time-varying cutoff point, we are likely to minimize the biases induced
by misclassiﬁcation.
IV. Patterns of Share Ownership in the United Kingdom
The overwhelming majority of U.K. households—more than 75 per-
cent—do not own shares directly. Furthermore, levels of share owner-
ship greater than 20 percent are a recent phenomenon. The level of
direct share ownership changed dramatically in the United Kingdom
in the 1980s, more than trebling over the period 1985–88.
4 This is shown
in ﬁgure 1 with data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Al-
though the FES contains little information on the amounts of assets
held by households, data on dividend and interest income can be used
to infer ownership of different assets, including stocks and shares. This
procedure for identifying share owners yields levels of ownership that
are very similar to those found in other data sources for individual years.
The rapid increase in share ownership coincided with a number of
measures designed to promote a “share-owning democracy.” The ﬁrst
was a program of privatization and the heavily advertised ﬂotation of a
number of public utilities including British Telecom (1984) and British
Gas (1986). Privatization accounts for a large part of the increase in the
number of share owners. More detailed information on share ownership
contained in the 1987 and 1988 General Household Surveys, for ex-
ample, shows that more than half of all shareholders owned shares in
privatized companies and that a large proportion of them owned shares
in only a privatized company. However, the evidence also suggests that
there was a more general increase in ownership of shares. The infor-
mation in the General Household Surveys shows that there was an in-
crease in the proportion of people owning “other” (i.e., nonprivatized)
4 At the same time as the proportion of the population owning shares directly has
increased, the total proportion of shares owned directly by the personal sector has fallen.
In 1957, nearly two-thirds of all shares were owned directly by individuals. By 1975 the
ﬁgure was 37.5 percent, and by 1994 it had fallen to 20.3 percent. This is largely the result
of a rapid growth in institutional ownership by pension funds and insurance companies.
In this paper the group of shareholders is deﬁned only as those who hold shares directly
since the equilibrium relationships described in the previous section should hold for this
subset of individuals.asset holding 781
Fig. 1.—Share ownership, 1978–95
shares from 10 percent in 1987 to 13 percent in 1988. This may have
been partially brought about indirectly through privatization and the
knock-on effects of increased awareness of and knowledge about share
ownership.
5 A second measure introduced by the government was tax-
favored employee share schemes, three of which were brought in be-
tween 1979 and 1984. By 1988 the total number of employees partici-
pating in such schemes was over 1.1 million. More recently, in 1988 the
government introduced tax-free personal equity plans for limited direct
and indirect equity holdings, and by 1999 these plans were held by 10
percent of the population. Toward the end of the 1990s the conversion
of mutual building societies into banks also resulted in windfall allo-
cations of shares to millions of building society account holders and
mortgagors.
As the level of share ownership increased during the 1990s, the com-
5 Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) explain the low levels of direct share ownership by ap-
pealing to inertia and lack of information. Their conclusion is that an increase in share
ownership may be brought about by extensive initial advertising plus a continuous ﬂow
of information, but this may not be effective in drawing stockholders from lower-income
groups.782 journal of political economy
TABLE 1
Probit Estimation for Share Ownership
Parameter Standard Error Marginal Effect
Age of head .281 .022 .055
(Age of head)
2 .021 .006 .004
Head has A levels .697 .031 .160
College education 1.198 .039 .349
Age#A levels .082 .013 .016
Age#college .117 .016 .023
Trend 3.522 .875 .687
Trend
2 31.553 5.060 6.158
Trend
3 104.932 12.181 20.479
Trend
4 127.493 12.888 24.882
Trend
5 51.629 4.960 10.076
Age#trend .212 .083 .042
Age#trend
2 .365 .047 .071
A levels#trend .634 .058 .124
College#trend .122 .076 .024
Constant 2.022 .051 …
Observations 83,736
Pseudo
2 R .1203
position of the group of shareholders also changed, which suggests that
controlling for the changing composition of shareholders over this pe-
riod may be an important issue. In general, shareholders tend to be
older and better educated than the rest of the population, but these
differences have been getting smaller over time. Descriptive evidence
from the data shows that the average age of those owning stocks and
shares has fallen from 56.5 in 1978 to 51.7 in 1995. The differential
associated with higher levels of education has also fallen over time. In
1978, 63.7 percent of households with shares had a head with postcom-
pulsory education, compared with 33.5 percent of all households. By
1988, the proportion of share-owning households with heads with
postcompulsory education had fallen to 61.7 percent, whereas the pro-
portion of all household heads with postcompulsory education had ac-
tually increased to 41.3 percent.
These effects can be seen clearly in the results of the probit regression
we use to predict share ownership, which is presented in table 1. The
probit is estimated on pooled data from the FES for 1978–95—more
than 80,000 households in total. For the reasons outlined in the previous
section, the right-hand-side variables are constrained to be those that
are constant over time or those that evolve in a predictable way. From
the set of potential demographic and economic variables in the FES,
we select age, education, and time. However, we adopt a very ﬂexible
speciﬁcation including higher-order terms in age and time. We also
interact the time trend with the other explanatory variables to allow for
the fact that the effects of age and education appear to change overasset holding 783
time. We obtain very similar results by estimating a different probit for
each year in the sample. The results show that the probability of share
ownership increases with age, time, and higher levels of education, al-
though the positive effects of college education and A levels on share
ownership diminish over time.
V. Results
We start our exercise by simply comparing the time-series properties of
consumption growth for the two groups of predicted (or likely) share-
holders and nonshareholders. On average, the predicted shareholders
have higher consumption growth over the period than nonshareholders:
0.29 percent per quarter for shareholders compared to 0.06 percent
for nonshareholders when we use the variable cutoff point and 0.12 and
0.08 when we use the ﬁxed one. The standard deviation of the time
series of average consumption growth (adjusted to take account of the
variance induced by sampling error and differences in cell size)
6 is
almost twice as high: 3.7 for shareholders compared to 2.5 for non-
shareholders when we use a variable cutoff point and 3.3 compared to
2.6 when we use a ﬁxed cutoff. If we compute the rate of growth for
actual share owners and non–share owners, the difference is even more
dramatic. The standard deviation of the time series of average con-
sumption growth (again adjusted for sampling error) is almost twice as
high: 6.52 for shareholders compared to 3.37 for nonshareholders.
These numbers compare to a standard deviation of 0.88 percent for
per capita quarterly consumption growth in the National Income and
Product Account series over the same time period. Some of this dramatic
difference may arise from inconsistencies in the two series deﬁnitions.
In particular, there are differences in the included consumption items,
in the sector deﬁnitions (namely, the presence of nonhouseholds in the
national accounts series), and in the per capita versus per adult equiv-
alent conversion of total expenditure. However, the most important
differences are likely to be due to aggregation issues, consistent with
the results for the United States of Vissing-Jørgensen (1999), who points
out that aggregation bias can be substantial in computing the mean and
standard deviation of the IMRS.
This evidence, consistent with that presented by Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991), suggests that differences between share owners and non–share
owners are likely to be important in estimating consumption growth
6 This adjustment is important: the fact that the sample of stock owners is smaller than
the sample of non–stock owners implies that sampling variability accounts for part of the
difference in the time-series variance of consumption growth of the two groups. Fortu-
nately, we have information on sample sizes and within-cell variability that allows us to
correct for this effect.784 journal of political economy
and intertemporal substitute parameters. But a greater variance is a
necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for resolving the puzzle. One
would observe higher variances if the sample of stockholders were more
affected by measurement error. In conjunction with a higher variance,
we need a higher (conditional) correlation of the IMRS of shareholders
with the excess returns on shares. It is hard to imagine how measurement
error would induce such a correlation with intertemporal prices. For
this reason we turn to the estimation of Euler equations. In particular,
we estimate several versions of the Euler equation given by expression
(4) that differ for the sample used to compute average consumption
growth: the entire sample, actual shareholders, and likely and unlikely
shareholders. More precisely, we consider the return on stocks ( ) and
s rt
Treasury bills ( ) and estimate, for each of the samples of likely and
b rt
unlikely share owners, the two Euler equations:
ss r p gD lnc  b  u , (9a) t 1 t 1 t
bb r p gD lnc  b  u . (9b) t 2 t 2 t
To estimate the parameters of these equations, we use the normalization-
free GMM procedure proposed by Hansen and Singleton (1996). How-
ever, given the nature of our data and problem, we have to modify it
slightly. First, unlike Hansen and Singleton, we do not use only lagged
interest rates and consumption growth as instruments. Second, since
the residuals of our expression are characterized by an MA(1) process,
both because of the limited sample size at the micro level and because
of potential time aggregation effects, we use instruments dated or t  2
earlier. Finally, to improve efﬁciency, we take into account explicitly the
nature of the residuals to construct a feasible generalized least squares
type of estimator and (forward) ﬁlter the consumption growth and in-
terest rate data after obtaining an estimate of the MA(1) parameter in
a ﬁrst step. Details of the estimation procedure are given in Appendix
B. Consumption growth is measured as the change in the log of desea-
sonalized consumption per adult equivalent in the various groups con-
sidered. The instruments, which include the second lag of consumption
growth and several ﬁnancial variables, are listed in the notes to tables
2 and 3. In each table, we also report the for the reduced-form
2 R
regressions for and In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, we report
bs Dlnc, r , r . tt t
the point estimates of the intercepts and slopes of equations (9a) and
(9b) (b’s and g’s). For each sample we consider, we estimate the system
both with and without the cross-equation restriction that Col- g p g . 12
umns 3 and 6 contain a test of the overidentifying restrictions, along
with its p-value in parentheses.
First, we present the results obtained in our sample if one uses actualasset holding 785
TABLE 2
GMM Estimation of Euler Equations for Returns on Shares and Treasury Bills
Share Equation Treasury Bill Equation
b1
(1)
g1
(2)
J
(3)
b2
(4)
g2
(5)
J
(6)
A. Whole Sample
Unrestricted .022
(.030)
6.853
(2.779)
5.85
(.441)
.009
(.006)
1.448
(.513)
7.362
(.289)
Restricted .026
(.021)
5.226
(1.492)
… .005
(.020)
5.226
(1.492)
14.43
(.344)
First-stage : : .045; : .484; : .171
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
B. Shareholders
Unrestricted .029
(.030)
3.527
(.916)
10.165
(.118)
.009
(.010)
.548
(.149)
9.34
(.155)
Restricted .034
(.013)
1.439
(.337)
… .010
(.010)
1.439
(.337)
18.244
(.148)
First-stage : : .082; : .469; : .10
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
C. Nonshareholders
Unrestricted .025
(.064)
16.442
(7.782)
4.055
(.669)
.009
(.033)
8.564
(4.165)
5.667
(.462)
Restricted .036
(.067)
18.107
(7.181)
… .013
(.066)
18.107
(7.181)
13.468
(.412)
First-stage : : .020; : .495; : .167
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Instruments include a constant, a dummy for ﬁnancial liberalization,
and the second lag of the rate of growth in consumption, share returns, Treasury bill returns, the spread between three-
month Treasury bills and 20-year bonds, the spread between 20-year and ﬁve-year bonds, and inﬂation. The three
2 R
values refer to those of the ﬁrst step for consumption growth, return on Treasury bills, and return on stocks, respectively,
in each of the samples. The sample period is 1978:4–1995:4. In cols. 3 and 6, J is a test of the overidentifying restrictions.
share ownership rates to deﬁne the two sample groups as opposed to
predicted or likely ownership. In the three panels of table 2, we report
estimates for the whole sample and for the subsample of actual share-
holders and nonshareholders. As mentioned above, the owners at times
t and are not necessarily the same, which constitutes a problem t  1
for the interpretation of consumption changes from one period to the
next.
In panel A, the estimates for the total sample indicate a very high
value of the coefﬁcient of risk aversion, when this is estimated both from
the Euler equation for shares and from the equations for shares and
Treasury bills jointly. On the other hand, we obtain a much smaller
value from the equation on Treasury bills only. In neither case, however,
does the test of overidentifying restrictions reject the null. Panels B and
C show that although the estimates are somewhat better for sharehold-
ers, the same is not true for nonshareholders. In particular, the restricted
estimate of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is 1.439 in the sample
of shareholders and 18.1 in the sample of nonshareholders. Notice
that for the group of shareholders, however, the test of overidentifying786 journal of political economy
TABLE 3
GMM Estimation of Euler Equations: Predicted Shareholders
Share Equation Treasury Bill Equation
b1
(1)
g1
(2)
J
(3)
b2
(4)
g2
(5)
J
(6)
A. Predicted Shareholders (Variable Cutoff)
Unrestricted .0170
(.015)
1.498
(.529)
1.550
(.956)
.006
(.008)
1.027
(.365)
8.231
(.222)
Restricted .030
(.010)
.647
(.180)
… .007
(.005)
.647
(.180)
13.47
(.415)
First-stage : : .118; : .473; : .178
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
B. Predicted Nonshareholders (Variable Cutoff)
Unrestricted .0207
(1.592)
4.861
(2.093)
5.976
(.426)
.009
(.027)
7.179
(2.684)
8.724
(.190)
Restricted .0492
(.097)
27.058
(8.440)
… .0288
(.096)
27.058
(8.440)
14.58
(.334)
First-stage : : .038; : .504; : .164
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
C. Predicted Shareholders (Fixed Cutoff)
Unrestricted .0180
(.0233)
3.175
(1.014)
5.22
(.516)
.007
(.010)
1.366
(.467)
9.409
(.152)
Restricted .032
(.011)
1.065
(.325)
… .007
(.007)
1.065
(.325
13.22
(.431)
First-stage : : .172; : .471; : .171
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
D. Predicted Nonshareholders (Fixed Cutoff)
Unrestricted .0216
(.051)
12.868
(4.824)
6.279
(.393)
.009
(.008)
2.121
(.799)
7.826
(.251)
Restricted .015
(.075)
20.524
(6.503)
… .005
(.075)
20.524
(6.503
14.30
(.353)
First-stage : : .031; : .506; : .161
2 bs R Dlnc Dr Dr tt t
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Instruments include a constant, a dummy for ﬁnancial liberalization,
and the second lag of the rate of growth in consumption, share returns, Treasury bill returns, the spread between three-
month Treasury bills and 20-year bonds, the spread between 20-year and ﬁve-years bonds, and inﬂation. The three
values refer to those of the ﬁrst step for consumption growth, return on Treasury bills, and return on stocks,
2 R
respectively, in each of the samples. The sample period is 1978:4–1995:4. In cols. 3 and 6, J is a test of the overidentifying
restrictions.
restrictions is close to rejecting the null (p-value of .1), probably as a
consequence of the large differences between the unrestricted slope
estimates in the two equations. Moreover, the estimates of g obtained
from the Euler equation for Treasury bills vary considerably across
samples.
As mentioned above, changes in ownership patterns would cause these
results to be biased. For this reason we present in table 3 the results we
obtain using our approach, which uses predicted share ownership status
to deﬁne groups that are constant over adjacent periods. As we discussed
in Section III, there are several ways in which we can deﬁne the group
of the likely shareholders, depending on the deﬁnition of the cutoff
point pt in equation (8). In estimating Euler equations such as (4), weasset holding 787
experiment with two alternatives. First, we choose the point ptto coincide
with the average proportion of shareholders in each period of our sam-
ple. Second, we keep pt ﬁxed at 20 percent in all sample periods. As
discussed above, the ﬁrst deﬁnition is likely to minimize the “misclas-
siﬁcation” of shareholders, whereas the second is aimed at minimizing
the problems induced by changes in the composition of the group of
shareholders.
Panels A and C of table 3 give the results for the predicted share-
holders (deﬁned according to the variable and ﬁxed cutoffs, respec-
tively) and show that the model performs well for this group. More
speciﬁcally, in both cases the estimate of the risk aversion coefﬁcient is
plausible and is estimated with reasonable precision. Moreover, the
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. The point estimate of g is
very close to unity in the sample of likely shareholders deﬁned with the
ﬁxed cutoff and a bit smaller in the sample with the variable cutoff. In
panels B and D, we report the results for the likely nonshareholders.
These estimates indicate very implausible values for the coefﬁcient of
risk aversion when this is estimated either with the share returns equa-
tion or with the two equations jointly, as would be expected, since the
Euler equation for shares should not hold for this group. In the variable
cutoff sample, the estimates are negative; in the other sample, they are
positive but implausibly large. Although the overidentiﬁcation restric-
tions are not rejected, the low for consumption growth suggests that
2 R
this may be due to weak instruments.
7
The estimate of g obtained when one uses the equation for Treasury
bills only in the ﬁxed cutoff point is not signiﬁcantly different across
groups. In the sample with the variable cutoff point, however, the point
estimate from the Treasury bill equation is considerably larger (even
though the parameter is estimated with low precision) in the group of
unlikely shareholders. If we think that most people in the sample hold
some kind of safe asset, this evidence seems to indicate that the biases
induced by the changes in composition of shareholders (more relevant
for the variable cutoff point sample) are more important than those
caused by the misclassiﬁcation (which are more likely to be relevant in
the ﬁxed cutoff point sample). For this reason, our preferred set of
estimates are those in panel A. Values of g just above unity are not
inconsistent with the estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution obtained from the FES data on different sample periods by At-
7 In a previous version of the paper we showed that a Hayashi-Sims type GMM estimator
that was not normalization-free gives estimates of the structural parameters similar tothose
reported, but also that the test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the null for the sample
of the likely nonshareholders and for the whole sample and does not reject it for the
sample of likely shareholders.788 journal of political economy
tanasio and Weber (1993) and Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994),
among others.
Notice that the point estimates of g obtained from the restricted
system in the sample of likely shareholders are lower but not too dif-
ferent from those obtained with the sample of actual shareholders, es-
pecially with the ﬁxed cutoff. However, when actual shareholders are
used, unlike the results for the ﬁxed cutoff point in table 3, the point
estimates of g obtained from only the Treasury bill equation change
considerably across groups, once again pointing to the importance of
the biases induced by changes in composition.
The interpretation of the constants of equations (9a) and (9b) is not
completely straightforward since these constants include the discount
factors and the unconditional second moments of asset returns and
consumption growth, as shown in equation (5). However, the difference
between the two constants should be equal to the difference between
the variances of the two asset returns and the difference between the
covariances of each of them with consumption. If we take the uncon-
ditional variance of the two assets to be as in the sample period (0.09
2
and 0.012
2) and (as estimated in panel C), the implied dif- g p 1.065
ference between the covariance of consumption with share returns and
that with Treasury bill returns would be about 0.026 (if one uses the
point estimates for the b’s from the restricted system) or 0.019 (if one
uses those from the unrestricted one). This is too high, in absolute
value, to be consistent with the observed variances of consumption
growth and asset returns, but given the lack of precision with which the
constant terms are estimated, such an inference from these point esti-
mates is not particularly appropriate.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has looked at the empirical failure of the consumption asset
pricing model in the context of recent secular changes in the number
and type of shareholders in the United Kingdom. Since the ﬁrst-order
conditions for the model hold as an equality only for individuals that
are currently participating in asset markets, it is natural to look at the
consumption behavior of these individuals rather than the aggregate
population. Pursuing this empirical strategy poses a number of prob-
lems. Not only do we need household-level information on consumption
and on asset ownership, but we also have to deal with the fact that asset
ownership is neither a permanent nor an exogenous status for the house-
holds in the survey. In addition, the available data for the United King-
dom, while providing excellent information on consumption and share
ownership, are not a panel. This is problematic since the Euler equation
holds only for those owning shares in adjacent periods. To deal withasset holding 789
this, we develop an extension of the synthetic cohort technique that
deﬁnes groups of individuals with constant membership at adjacent
dates on the basis of the estimated probabilities of owning stocks. In
the empirical application, therefore, we deﬁne a group of “likely
shareholders.”
We obtain strong results. When we estimate Euler equations for the
group of likely shareholders, using both a single asset and two assets
simultaneously, we obtain sensible values for the parameter of interest
(the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and we fail to reject the
overidentifying restrictions implied by the model. For the other groups
(the total sample and the unlikely shareholders), we obtain unappealing
estimates of the structural parameters. This last result is important in
showing that there is some empirical power in our approach. We also
present some evidence that indicates that the bias induced by changes
in the composition of share owners is important: estimates of the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution vary widely across groups when we
divide the sample on the basis of actual ownership and are much more
stable when we use the method we devise to minimize this type of bias.
In summary, we have shown that the time-series properties of share-
holders’ consumption growth are very different from those of non-
shareholders and aggregate consumption growth. And they are different
in a way that is consistent with some of the implications of the con-
sumption CAPM. In particular, estimates of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution obtained from two Euler equations for shareholders
(one for bond returns and one for share returns) are consistent with
each other and theoretically plausible. We have not tried to model the
conditional second moments, whose means enter the intercept of the
Euler equation we have estimated. These are important restrictions that
should be checked to claim whether the so-called equity premium puzzle
can be explained by limited participation and differences in the time-
series properties of the consumption of stock owners and non–stock
owners.
Our results suggest a number of extensions. Given the limitations in
our sample period and the reliance on time-series variation to identify
the parameters of interest, we have worked with very simple preference
speciﬁcations. It would be interesting to work with preferences that are
more general in the way demographic and labor supply factors are
allowed to affect utilities. More generally, it would also be interesting
to consider more ﬂexible forms of preferences, including the non–
expected utility preferences of the kind studied by Epstein and Zin
(1989) and models with habit formation. In particular, Attanasio and
Weber (1989) showed that with Epstein-Zin preferences and an unob-
servable market portfolio, in a system like (9), g represents the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The coefﬁcient of relative790 journal of political economy
risk aversion is buried in the intercepts of the system and is not easily
identiﬁable. These preferences might be appealed to in order to justify
the fact that, as we discussed at the end of Section V, the point estimates
of our intercepts seem inconsistent with the relative magnitude of the
unconditional variances of returns.
The most important challenge, however, and the puzzle that our study
leaves unresolved, is to explain the limited ownership of shares more
structurally, particularly given the size of average excess returns. The
descriptive evidence we present is suggestive and shows that the increase
in ownership was quite widespread in the population. While it was prob-
ably triggered by the privatizations of the mid 1980s and by the asso-
ciated publicity, the trends cannot be explained only by that episode or
by the ownership of shares in privatized ﬁrms. Understanding the fac-
tors, such as ﬁxed costs, that still prevent ownership for large sectors of
the population remains an important topic for future research.
Appendix A
The Data
To estimate our model we make use of 18 consecutive years of the Family Ex-
penditure Survey running from 1978 to 1995. The FES is collected by the Ofﬁce
for National Statistics, primarily with the purpose of computing weights for the
retail price index. However, the survey contains detailed information on the
income and demographic characteristics of British households as well as their
expenditure patterns. For our analysis we select only households in which the
head of the household is between ages 20 and 59. This leaves a total of 83,736
households, an average of 1,163 per quarter (with a minimum of 1,008 and a
maximum of 1,269). As discussed in the text, share ownership is imputed from
responses to the income part of the questionnaire, which collects information
on detailed components of income. In the case of asset-related components,
the questions refer to the previous 12 months. The proportion of imputed
shareholders observed in each quarter has a minimum of 0.0627andamaximum
of 0.2621 over our sample period. The time-series pattern of this proportion
corresponds closely to other sources of data on direct ownership of shares in
the periods in which they are available.
For the purposes of predicting likely share ownership, we use a speciﬁcation
interacting age, education, and time effects. Age is deﬁned as the current age
of the head of the household only. A similar criterion applies to education,
where we construct three measures of household education according to
whether the head of the household left full-time education at or before the
compulsory school-leaving age, between this age and 18, and above age 18. We
refer to the penultimate group as having A levels and the ﬁnal group as having
college education.
Information on expenditure is collected by means of a two-weekdiarycovering
all expenditures by all household members. We construct a deﬁnition of total
nondurable expenditures that excludes expenditures on housing, cars, electrical
equipment, furniture, and furnishings. Nondurable expenditures are averaged
over the two-week period, aggregated to the household level, and then dividedasset holding 791
by an equivalence scale (to take account of the composition of the household)
and deseasonalized for use in our analysis. A detailed analysis of FES income
and spending data over time shows that, for nondurable items in particular, the
FES captures a large and constant proportion of household expenditures as
measured from other sources of aggregate information (see Banks and Johnson
[1998] for further details of these results as well as a detailed description of the
FES sample).
Appendix B
Estimation Methods
In this Appendix we describe in detail the GMM procedure we used to estimate
the Euler equations in Section V. As mentioned, we modify the normalization-
free GMM procedure proposed by Hansen and Singleton (1996). The essence
of the method, which makes it normalization-free, consists in noticing that given
a value of g, the reduced-form parameters can be written in closed form in a
very simple way. In particular, given a matrix of instruments z (which does T#k
not include a constant term), the three endogenous variables and
sb Dlnc, r , r , tt t
and a value of g, one can write a reduced form consistent with the structural
system in (9) as
Dlnc i00 p zu cc
b r p 0i0 p  gz P  u , (A1) bb ()( ) ( ) ( )( )
s r 00i pg zu ss
where the i’s, the 0’s, and the u’s are vectors of ones, zeros, and residuals, T#1
respectively; the p’s are scalars; and P is a vector. Such an equation can k#1
be rewritten as
Y p Xbu,( A 2 )
where and u
  are 3T vectors, X a matrix, and
   s  b  Y p (Dlnc , r , r )3 T#(k3)
b a vector. k3
Given g, an estimate of P can be obtained by ordinary least squares from
system (A1). One can then obtain an estimate of g by grid search, minimizing
the function for some given weighting matrix W.
   (YXb)( XW X )(YXb)
We adjusted this basic procedure to take into account the peculiarity of our
problem and performed the following steps. (1) We estimate the reduced form
(A1) for the three endogenous variables. (2) We compute the coefﬁcient of the
MA(1) process implied by the presence of sampling error in the residuals of
the reduced form. (3) We forward ﬁlter equation (A2) and perform a grid
search to get a ﬁrst estimate of g that minimizes
∗∗     ∗ (Y X b)( XW X )(Y 
where and are the ﬁltered Y and X, respectively, and W is the
∗∗ ∗ X b), YX
identity matrix. (4) We obtain an estimate of the residuals and compute a new
W matrix based on these residuals: and perform an addi-
   1 W p ( XuuX) t ttt t
tional grid search to determine our ﬁnal estimate of g. (5) The variance-covar-
iance matrix of the parameters so obtained is computed using the formula
     1   1 V p {[ (z d )][ (z e)(z e)] [  (z d )] } , t t tt tt t t792 journal of political economy
where the et are the two ﬁnal estimated residuals,anddtisthevectorofderivatives
of et with respect to g, b1, and b2, that is,
dc dc tt
d p 10. t ()
01
The Gauss program that computes these estimatesisavailablefromtheauthors
on request.
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